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Encouraging Inter-Agency Coordination 
David Wright 
One would expect that inter-agency coordination is a pre-requisite of all development assistance 
initiatives. Unfortunately coordination has never been given the attention it deserves, although recently 
there have been some significant moves to facilitate both interagency coordination and cooperation, 
notably in the environment sector. This presentation provides a brief introduction to t11e various 
agencies involved in development assistance, outlines some of the causes and impacts of poor 
coordination and gives recent examples of donor coordination initiatives related to the environment and 
sustainable development. 
The Agencies 
There are scores of agencies offering development assistance, each with its own mandate and its own 
peculiar methods of conducting business. First, there are sources of "bilateral assistance" given from one 
country to another through organizations such as USAID. This assistance is provided primarily by 3 
industrialized countries collectively referred to as tl1e Organization for Economic Cooperation on 
Development (OECD). Eastem Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS countries) 
were, in the recent past, sources of funds for assistance projects, but have recently become, temporarily 
at least, consumers rather than suppliers of assistance. There is also special-circumstance bilateral 
assistance. For example India provides bilateral assistance to neighboring countries such as Bhutan 
whereas China has provided development assistance to Nepal. 
Multilateral assistance is delivered through either the Breton Woods Institutions (development banks) 
or the United Nations system. In Asia, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank fund relatively 
large-scale structural adjustment loans and investment projects which, in the natural resources sector, 
can range from a few million to hundreds of millions of dollars each. 
The UN system is responsible for teclmical assistance activities which focus on capacity building, 
human resource development, pre-investment activities, research and technology transfer. There are 
about forty UN system and specialized agency organizations, most of which are restricted to specific 
sectors such as education, food, health or the environment. The largest agency of the UN system is the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) which has annual financial resources exceeding $1 
billion. UNDP has the broad mandate of enhancing self-reliance and promoting sustainable human 
development. The UN system is currently undergoing reformation and some consolidation is underway 
which is intended to facilitate more efficient delivery of development assistance. The combined financial 
resources of the United Nations system is about $6 billion. In fact, the total financial resources from all 
multilateral and bilateral sources (the Official Development Assistance-ODA) cunently amounts to only 
$54 billion per year. 
Finally, there is development .assistance from unofficial sources, primarily nortllem non-
governmental organizations (NGO'S), prqviding $5 billion per year. 
Total funds available for development assistance are modest relative to need. By comparison, third 
world military spending is almost $150 billion per year, nearly tllree times the ODA. In spite of the 
scarcity of funds, there is no scarcity of development agencies, all mandated to deliver specific programs 
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and projects. In some cases, developing countries must face 50 to 100 different organizations all eager to 
help and all looking for attention. 
The large number of aid agencies can be bewildeling to even the most experienced government 
official and one can only imagine what it is like for the rural poor who are the intended key 
beneficiaries. In countries targeted by the development community, including those in the Himalayan 
region, there is a continuous stream of "missions", visiting specialists who come to develop or review 
and evaluate programs and projects. Each mission is intent on meeting senior officials and embarking 
on field trips where meetings with the rural people are a high priority. Although the intentions of 
missions are well-meaning (many are committed to involving local people in project design and 
implementation), the process places major strains on limited government resources. Governments end 
up committing their most capable and best-trained administrators to service missions, and often provide 
scarce infrastructure support such as vehicles, office space and related equipment. Efforts by the 
development community for "capacity building" too often become "capacity consuming." 
Causes of lack of coordination 
There are a number of shortcomings in the development process hindering inter-agency coordination. 
Multilateral and bilateral agencies are not known to be models of management efficiency and each has a 
unique system for processing projects. Efforts to harmonize project cycles among the development 
agencies are very difficult and can often delay financing. Similarly, govenunents in developing countries 
are often incapable of dealing efficiently with the donor community. Lack of coordination among 
various agencies of developing country governments compounds the problem. 
The forces of human motivation are also partly to blame for inefficient agency coordination. 
Technical staff and consultants are more apt to be rewarded for short-term success (i.e. "bagging a 
project") than for creation of a sound program guaranteed to have long-tenn benefits. The careers of 
some development workers can be enhanced by the size of their project portfolios. In addition, the 
people who prepare projects for agencies typically do not implement them. Finally, it is often simply 
an individual's impatience, who, when developing a project, finds agency coordination to be only a 
troublesome burden slowing the process (and possibly also slowing his/her career advancement). 
At the same time, there are certain risks associated with too much interagency coordination 
dominated by the agencies themselves. It is essential to recognize t11at national governments are in 
charge of development in their respective countries and t11ey are understandably nervous whenever 
agencies take it upon themselves to provide a major coordination function, in particular at the country 
level. Furthermore, excessive coordination can also reduce the competitiveness of development 
assistance which can be beneficial to the process. Governments have the right to choose from various 
development options and can benefit by pitting one agency against another to get the best terms and 
conditions for an assistance package. 
Impacts of poor coordination 
There is no doubt that the overriding impact of poor coordination is poor development assistance. 
Firstly, money is wasted through the duplication of effort. Secondly, lessons learned from past mistakes 
are often not shared among agencies. Thirdly, human resources are wasted, particularly trained, capable 
technocrats within developing country agencies. Probably the most damaging result of poor agency 
coordination is inconsistent advice. This is particularly important now that a high pliority is given by 
agencies to structural reforms, improved policy and strategic planning. If, for example a World Bank 
expert arrives on a Monday, suggesting one tl1ing and on Friday, an expe1t from t11e Asian Development 
Bank suggests something else, consistent and sustainable development is not possible. 
Recent examples of donor coordina~ion 
In spite of the valid cliticisms, there bas been recent progress by the development community in 
providing more orderly and effective development assistance. Using UNDP as an example, t11e Resident 
Representative who beads each field office in 128 developing countries, is usually designated the 
Resident Coordinator for the United Nations System's operational activities in that country. UNDP is 
working hard to strengthen this donor coordination role. 
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Another example (again drawing from the UNDP expelience) is U1e "Round Table" process developed 
for the world's poorest countries- U1e "Least Developed Countiies" (LDCS), primarily in Africa. Using 
extensive, systematically collected background material, UNDP and LDC governments co-host regular 
Round-Table conferences in U1e counu·y in question and in Geneva wi!11 all the key donors to review 
development plans, raise funds and discuss a coordinated development strategy. 
AnoU1er important step which UNDP has L:'lken to improve delivery of development assistance, is 
!11e so-called "program approach." Instead of funding scores of small fragmented individual projects, 
UNDP staff help governments develop a broad plan for development and U1en package interventions 
from many different sources into broader programs. A good recent example is Bolivia where U1e 
government, wiU1 assistance from UNDP, prepared a comprehensive five year counu·y program which 
included all aspects of development, boU1 domestic and foreign-assisted. As the program is being 
implemented, UNDP provides strategic inputs (e.g. help to reform instjtutions in a sector) and 
coordinates fund raising activities from oilier donors, including U1e multilateral development banks. 
Related to tile program approach is a move towards "national execution", where governments are 
given full responsibility for U1e execution of programs and projects, instead of agencies. This is positive 
for coordination, since govemments have more conu·ol over U1eir own destiny. UNDP is also decreasing 
its reliance on foreign experts. In 1991 we recruited 20,000 experts and more than 11,000 were 
nationals. Quite obviously, nationals know a lot more about what is going on in their own country and 
activities can Ulerefore be better coordinated. 
New Co-managed Initiatives 
Several multi-agency programs facilitating U1e coordination of development assistance have evolved 
in recent years particularly in the environmental field. The first of U1ese was U1e Tropical Forest Action 
Program (TFAP) co-founded by FAO, UNDP, U1e World Bank and the World Resources Institute in 
1984. TFAP has brought attention to foresu·y issues and a measure of order to development assistance 
in tile forestry sector. There are cwTently TFAP programs completed or in progress in more U1an 80 
countries. 
A criticism of TFAP leveled by many developing counu·ies is U1e lack of follow-up investment 
funding after TFAP studies take place. A solution offered primarily by U1e Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) is U1e "Master Plan for Forest Development" (MPFD) approach. In U1is program, U1e ADB, 
tends to play tile role of coordinator. Emphasis is typically given to preparation of an investment 
program and creation of a better environment for investment projects U1rough policy reforms and 
institutional changes . Both Nepal and Bhutan have direct experience with U1ese Forestry Master Plans. 
There have been numerous critics of MPFDS, but a benefit of this initiative has been a significant 
improvement in interagency coordination. 
More recently, we have seen tl1e new global environmental initiatives, beginning with tl1e Interim 
Multi-Lateral Fund of tile Monu·eal Protocol. This fund was established in 1990 to assist developing 
countries who have signed the Protocol, (meaning they have pledged to phase out the use of ozone 
depleting substances) carry out tJ1eir commitinents. Agencies responsible for implementation of tJ1e 
assistance program are U1e United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), UN Indusu·ial Development 
Organization (UNIDO), UNDP and U1e World Bank. The glue which binds inter-agency coordination is 
tile Convention itself and a consolidated Work Program developed by the agencies, but approved by the 
Parties to the Convention. Between 180 and 240 million dollars will be committed over U1e next three 
years in almost 30 countries, facilitating conversion of equipment and industi'ies which produce or 
consume ozone depleting substances. These substances include the chlorotluorocarbons (CFCS) found 
in many propellants, coolants and solvents. 
The latest major coordinated initiative Is U1e Global Environment Facility (GEF). This billion dollar 
Facility funds projects focusing on four themes: (I) global wanning; (II) biological diversity ; (III.) 
international water pollution; and (IV) ozone depletion . It is co-managed by tJuee agencies UNDP, 
UNEP and the World Bank. A separate feature of GEF is an NGO small gran ts progrrun mru1aged by 
UNDP in a decenu·alized manner relying on its network of 18 field offices. 
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Most of the. core fund of GEF has now been committed to projects. About 30% is allotted to 
technical assistance, capacity-building and preinvestment under UNDP'S direction. Two-ti1irds of the 
fund is committed to Bank-led investment projects and til e remainder is to be spent on activities 
promoting tile Biodiversity Convention and tile Framework Convention on Climate Change-tile two 
global environmental Conventions signed by world leaders at tile Earti1 Sununit in Rio in June, 1992. 
Boti1 Nepal and Bhutan recei ve funding assistance from GEF for the conservation of biodiversity 
projects. 
The GEF is now moving from a ti1ree-year pilot phase to an operational phase, beginning in 1994. 
There had been some expectation tiwt ti1is facility could be broadened into a green fund giving more 
attention to national environmental problems. However, it was agreed at Rio that in tile foreseeable 
future, the GEF would continue to focus on ti1e four original global environmental ti1emes mentioned 
earlier. However, iliere was some concession in ti1at land degradation problems such as desertification 
and deforestation can now be considered for funding assistance, as ti1ey relate to existing ti1emes (i.e. 
provided ti1at ti1e initiative would conserve biodiversity or help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions). 
There are six important principles on which tile operational phase of tile GEF is expected to be 
based: 
1. The governance of GEF will be restructured to allow universal membership witi1 no "entry fee" 
for participating govenunents. 
2. The GEF must be transparent and accountable to conuibutors and beneficiaries alike. 
3. GEF will serve as ti1e interim funding mechanism for ti1e Biodiversity Convention and ti1e 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
4 . GEF funds will provide funding for ti1e agreed incremental costs for achieving agreed global 
environmental benefits. 
5. Interventions from GEF are to be cost effective. 
6. GEF programs and projects must be counu-y-driven and consistent with national priorities 
designed to support sustainable development. 
Conclusi o n 
International development has become increasing complex. As predicted by many, ti1e well-being of 
our planet is increasingly at risk not only because of short-sighted exploitation of our limited natural 
resources, but because of poverty, hunger and inadequate living conditions at the local level ti1roughout 
ilie developing world. As we move forward from tile Earti1 Summit and plans crystallize for ilie 
implementation of Agenda 21, including tile formation of a Commission for Sustainable Development, 
it is imperative iliat tile international development community improves its record in tile coordination of 
assistance measmes. 
David Wright is a Principal Technical Advisar to the UNDP, working on the Global Environmental 
Facility. He was previously working in Asia encouraging participatOiy.forestry and private tree farming 
activities. 
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